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Abstract 
In 2010, the ‘Brand Africa’ initiative was launched with the mission to transform 
perceptions of Africa from a continent of calamities into one of promising economic 
prospects and entrepreneurial populations. This transformation, ‘Brand Africa’ claims, 
is one where Africans take their representation from the hands of foreigners and make, 
through a new image, their own (hi)story. In this respect Brand Africa can be 
interpreted as a form of subaltern geopolitics seeking to subvert dominant geopolitical 
knowledge and to fight established structures of domination. However, the article 
argues its subversive elements are limited, especially when compared to the historical 
discourses of decolonial pan-Africanism upon which it draws for legitimacy. Indeed, 
while appropriating this legacy Brand Africa offers up a very different geopolitical 
vision of possible/desirable African futures. It is argued that this may be accounted for 
by understanding the extent to which the Brand Africa initiative appears embedded 
within a South African national context and its own geopolitical ambitions evident 
within its own nation-branding project. What this highlights in turn is that the 
emancipatory potential and assumed synergies between national and supranational 
branding central to the Brand Africa initiative are not as unproblematic or uncontested 
as claimed.   
**************************** 
 
 
 
“Brand-Africa is a pan-African inter-generational movement to create a positive image 
of Africa, celebrate our identity and inspire our competitiveness.  
 
It is a brand-driven approach which recognises that in the 21st century, brands are an 
asset and a key driver of value and reputation for individuals, institutions or sovereign 
nations and the collective African brand. 
 
Brand Africa seeks to achieve its goals by promoting intergenerational partnerships and 
a catalytic environment for investment, tourism and active citizenship; celebrating and 
showcasing Africa’s capabilities and achievements; improving its image, and 
celebrating Africa’s collective and diverse cultures, values and identity. Brand Africa is 
an independent and non-profit global African initiative for Africa by Africa” (original 
emphases).1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As the target year for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals has come 
and gone, depictions of Africa as the hopeless ‘dark continent’ continue to cohabit with 
optimistic narratives of ‘Africa rising’.2 Savvy business consultants proclaim a 
transformation is occurring from ‘hopeless to hopeful’ and point to fast-growing GDP 
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growth rates to present African economies as ‘lions on the move’3 in ‘the next 
investment frontier’.4  Elsewhere, doubt is cast over these discourses and the ‘great 
transformation’ is represented as a neo-colonial and neoliberal moment of fostering 
inequality and dispossession, a ‘new scramble for Africa’.5 In this context, increasing 
appeals are made for an improved African leadership to rise up to the challenges and 
opportunities of what has been called ‘the African Century’.6  
 
One example of such an appeal has been the ‘Brand Africa’ initiative, a state-supported 
private non-profit organisation established in 2010 by South African consultant, Thebe 
Ikalafeng. ‘Brand Africa’ describes its mission as one of transforming negative 
perceptions of the continent and in doing so to also transform its development 
prospects. Using cutting-edge tools of (nation-)‘branding’ and image management, 
Brand Africa promises to restitute ‘agenda-setting’ powers to African leaders and help 
them prevail in the struggle over representing Africa’s prospects. Successfully 
establishing a new supranational brand, and harnessing ‘the power and discipline of 
branding’, it is argued, will enhance Africa’s reputation, and therefore also its 
attractiveness, and ultimately its ability to compete and share in the fruits of global trade 
on a more equitable basis.7 
 
The discourse underlying this claim is certainly attractive. Instead of seeing Africa as 
structurally impotent to advance its position, trapped by established terms of trade into 
self-reproducing relations of exploitation and dependency, it is argued branding offers 
Africans the means to take control of their narrative and thereby shape a new future. 
This discourse, however attractive, needs critical examination on various accounts. This 
includes whether (re)branding actually does offer the magic bullet of poverty 
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alleviation,8 a claim focused on elsewhere.9 This paper, however, analyses Brand Africa 
through the scope of geopolitical prisms. In particular, it analyses how Brand Africa 
represents a distinctive new kind of geopolitical project – one which combines 
reference to the world-making powers of place branding with the supranational heritage 
of pan-Africanism. In crossing these lineages, a distinctive new form of ‘subaltern 
geopolitics’ seems to be in the making, though one we show is fraught with tensions 
and contradictions, both in terms of discursive logic and Brand Africa’s differential 
appeal to African actors.  
 
The paper proceeds in five sections. The first section outlines in more detail the 
fundamental problem of negative images facing Africa that the Brand Africa initiative 
identifies and responds to, in particular highlighting the ‘supranational’ dimensions of 
the problem. In the second section we introduce Joanne Sharp’s conception of subaltern 
geopolitics, an approach that demonstrates how the subaltern is not simply a recipient 
of others’ geopolitical discourses and framings, but also an actor capable of inverting 
and using established geopolitical frames to reassert a sense of agency and 
empowerment. In the third section we provide an outline of the pan-African 
supranationalism of the decolonial period and interpret this precisely as a subaltern 
geopolitical response to Eurocentric hegemonic geopolitical scripts depicting Africa as 
the ‘dark continent’. Such a pan-African subaltern geopolitics, we argue, was important 
in reclaiming a sense of agency and subjectivity for Africa and Africans, (re-
)establishing a sense of pride, status and ontological security that helped inspire 
confidence to cast off the shackles of colonialism and gain (geo)political ascendency 
through a supranational alignment. This focus on decolonial pan-Africanism is 
important as we move to the fourth section, which shifts the focus to contemporary 
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manifestations of pan-Africanism in the Brand Africa initiative. Brand Africa, it is 
noted, makes explicit claims to continue/renew this tradition, once again drawing on a 
rejuvenated (and now rebranded) pan-African supranationalism to enhance Africa’s 
economic prospects and sense of self-esteem once more. Pan-Africanism, therefore, is 
shown to reside as a source of inspiration and ontological security in the face of others’ 
continuing malign representations and ‘knowledge’ about Africa. However, the 
assumed synergies and compatibility between historical decolonial discourses of pan-
Africanism and those of contemporary Brand Africa are far from seamless. If historical 
decolonialisation discourses framed pan-Africanism through largely socialist and 
decolonial lenses, then Brand Africa restages pan-Africanism through a capitalist 
framing that impacts notably on its (geo)political and (geo)economic 
effects/implications. The final section further explores some of these tensions, in 
particular noting that the pan-Africanism embedded within the Brand Africa initiative 
also occludes how the initiative works to the benefit of some African nations more than 
others. As such, this raises questions about the presumed synergies between nation 
branding and supranational branding that underpins the very idea of Brand Africa.  
 
 
Africa’s Negative ‘Continent Brand Effect’ and the Need for (Geopolitical) 
Rebranding 
 
Underlying the Brand Africa project is the idea that presently Africa suffers from what 
the nation branding consultant, Simon Anholt, calls a negative ‘continent brand effect’, 
where the continent’s more progressive parts are tarred by unfavourable images not 
directly of their making.10 Typical to the western eye, undifferentiated images of a 
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collective (and dismal) African experience are circulated by news broadcasters and 
increasingly by many aid agencies competing with each other for attention and 
donations.11 This has been the case even in instances seeking to promote ‘ethical 
consumption’, argued by some to simplify African experience and developmental 
issues to a lack to be filled by Western benevolent consumerism.12 It is further evident 
in the emerging phenomenon of ‘celebrity humanitarianism’13 – a recent example being 
the Band Aid 30 re-release in winter 2014 of the song ‘Do They Know it’s Christmas’, 
in response to the Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia.14 These 
representations of Africa, and many others, perpetuate images of Africa as a ‘dark 
continent’ full of emptiness, misery, wildness and readiness to receive Western 
salvation; an ‘object of beauty, horror, pleasure and pity’.15   
 
To this extent Africa is a supranational ‘imagined community’ distinctive to other 
continents, none of which carries quite so much apparently self-evident constitutive 
meaning. The history of this scopic regime of Africa as the ‘dark continent’16 is, of 
course, connected to histories and experiences of colonialism and racist and orientalist 
attitudes towards African peoples. Indeed, as the Congolese philosopher V. Y. 
Mudimbe argues, the very idea of Africa was itself a non-African – and mainly 
European – invention that functioned as a ‘paradigm of difference’ through which 
Europeans identified themselves via the exoticisation and often denigration of the 
‘African other’.17 For instance, for Hegel sub-Saharan Africa remained in ‘the condition 
of mere nature’ and therefore had no place in world history.18 In this ‘invention’, Africa, 
a continent of 54 states, a billion people, and an arguably unparalleled cultural and 
linguistic diversity, has been ascribed as possessing a oneness and unity also 
unparalleled by other continents. The negative ‘continent brand effect’ identified by 
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Anholt precisely describes this situation where negative events in one corner of the 
continent are often taken to reflect Africa as a whole.19  
 
The imperative underpinning the Brand Africa initiative is therefore understood as the 
need to try and reclaim agency and ownership of the African brand, to respond to this 
supranational gaze via a supranational rebranding effort designed to change the 
narrative and offer up a different set of images regarding what might be deemed ‘typical 
of Africa’.20 As the influential economist, Dambisa Moyo, lamented at the inaugural 
Brand Africa Forum event in 2010, for too long ‘We’ve allowed other people to set the 
agenda’.21 Or as various Brand Africa publications frequently remark, if everyone else 
has an agenda in Africa, then Africa itself should get one.22 In such discourses Africa 
is not simply referenced as a geographical marker, but also (potentially) as a collective 
geopolitical actor.  
 
Indeed, insofar as a continent-focused branding campaign is seen as a necessary 
response to the damning echoes of a colonial orientalist gaze it highlights that 
place/nation branding is an inherently geopolitical activity.23 It is so because it focuses 
on the power of narratives about a polity’s identity and seeks to manage the 
imaginations of different audiences for the greatest strategic advantage. Utilising 
marketing theory and practice initially developed for the image management of 
corporations and products, ‘nation-branding’ purports to give polities a ‘competitive 
identity’ through carefully targeted media strategies. These are directed at both foreign 
and domestic audiences. With respect to foreign audiences the aim is typically to 
encourage investment, consumption and trade and improve international standing, 
whereas domestic audiences are encouraged to become more entrepreneurial, to ‘live 
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the brand’, with this also anticipated to enhance the community’s self-esteem.24 Nation 
branding therefore links together corporate marketing strategies with governmental 
techniques of public diplomacy and propaganda.25 As such, nation branding hybridises 
political and economic logics with this making the practice an important topic for 
examination by critical geopolitics. 
 
 
Brand Africa as (Subaltern) Geopolitics 
 
Claiming to counter the hegemonic marginalisation and denigration of Africa, Brand 
Africa can be understood as a manifestation of what Sharp terms ‘subaltern 
geopolitics’.26 Sharp posited subaltern geopolitics as an addendum to the critical 
geopolitics literature. This, she argues, has done well at examining how those 
marginalised in global politics have been represented in hegemonic discourses, but has 
done less well at considering ‘the politics of representation from the margins’.27 Indeed, 
Sharp argues that when attention has been focused on the representations of the 
marginalised there has been an unfortunate tendency to look for romanticised political 
alternatives untainted by Westernisation and power.28 Significantly, for the purposes of 
this paper, Sharp explicitly identifies pan-Africanist discourses as instances of such 
‘subaltern geopolitics’.29 
 
For Sharp, what the (military) concept of the subaltern illuminates is the fact that the 
weak and marginalised are rarely completely excluded and ‘outside of the ranks’, but 
rather of a ‘lower rank’. The concept therefore ‘recognises the entangled nature of 
global political relations but in such a way that does not deny “the asymmetry of power 
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relations and the production of subordinating modes of representation”’.30 Being in an 
asymmetrical power relationship, though, does not mean the margins possess no 
power.31 Marginality, she notes, is an ambiguous position from where there is the 
potential to work creatively to better it. Situated within and towards dominant 
geopolitical scripts the subaltern can still establish ‘creative alternatives’32 that do not 
outright reject dominant scripts, but rather seeks to secure a position of greater power 
through a mixture of reproduction and subversion.33 Aligning herself with Ayoob’s 
concept of ‘subaltern realism’, a concept that links an apparently weak position with a 
powerful vision, she also draws on Bhabha’s ideas about the potentials of hybridity and 
in particular the idea of ‘mimicry’ as an ambiguous strategy of subversion and survival 
that destabilises binary categories of inside/outside and that offers ‘a way of “doing” 
world politics in a seemingly “similar” yet unexpectedly “different” way.34  
 
Although broadly in agreement with her reading, we feel that Sharp over-emphasises 
the rational dimensions of subaltern geopolitics. In analysing the creativity and impetus 
of ‘subaltern geopolitics’ it is important not only to focus on the material structural 
weakness of the subaltern (as following the Realist thought of Ayoob might lead you 
to) but to recognise that the relational weakness of the subaltern is also produced – and 
resisted - socio-linguistically. This points to how a position of ambiguous marginality 
is intertwined with questions of identity and psychology that extend beyond a simple 
calculation of material power. In short, it is important not to efface the relevance of the 
historical experience of ‘colonialism’ in subaltern geopolitics (as we show below). The 
ambiguous marginality of colonial subaltern subjects, it must be remembered, was 
produced through the combination of a promise of empowerment and equality through 
cultural submission and the reality of a perpetual rejection of subaltern subjects as 
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capable of superseding the ‘external’ inferiority they were alleged to embody.35 In this 
context, the subaltern’s ‘breaking ranks’ has to be understood as not only a strategic act 
against circumstantial structural marginality, but also as a subjective reaction against a 
particular geopolitics and knowledge that fundamentally undermined the subaltern’s 
sense of ontological security and self-esteem.36 Indeed, appeals for a ‘solidarity of the 
weak’ and for morality in world politics – which Sharp presents as calculated ‘subaltern 
realist’ subversions – cannot be adequately understood without reference to these 
historical processes of identity-formation.  
 
Subaltern geopolitics in Africa, we argue, has not been simply about strategic 
considerations of interest enhancement but fundamentally connected with projects of 
post-colonial identity formation and the psychological recovery of the dignified ‘black 
man/African’. In doing so, subaltern geopolitics in Africa has been about overcoming 
the psychologically and culturally disabling forces of colonialism, as well as its material 
bases. Importantly, though, strategic concerns over interest and subjective concerns 
over identity do not oppose or exclude each other, but are as likely to co-constitute each 
other into an integrated vision.  
 
 
Decolonial Subaltern Geopolitics and the Origins of Pan-Africanism  
 
What these reflections indicate is that a reading of Brand Africa as a form of pan-
African (subaltern) geopolitics requires its embedding within the longer history of 
(subaltern) pan-Africanism. In particular, we refer here to the pan-Africanism of the 
decolonial movement upon which the Brand Africa project explicitly draws to enhance 
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its legitimacy, with this later enabling us to highlight Brand Africa’s distinctive and 
ultimately different geopolitical vision to that heritage. Moreover, highlighting the 
heritage of decolonial pan-Africanism can also help explain why there has been a 
perceived need to respond to a negative continental brand in continental terms through 
attempts to provide the brand with a more positive reading, and not in another way. 
Pan-Africanism, we highlight, has become an embedded element of ontological 
security seeking across the continent, such that thinking and responding in pan-African 
terms not only ‘makes sense’, but responds to important affective and psychological 
predispositions that are not easily given up.  
 
As a form of subaltern geopolitics pan-Africanism emerged in the late nineteenth 
century, maintaining momentum through to the late twentieth century. During this 
period ‘colonial subjects’ sought to creatively re-appropriate the ‘paradigms of 
difference’ that had normalized mass violence and forge a political path out of 
colonialism. In this context, ‘Africanity’ was re-laboured from a racial or geographical 
depreciative marker to the basis for the creation of a broad subaltern ‘imagined 
community’. More than the scopic regimes of coloniality, it was this subaltern political 
experiment that led to the stabilisation of imagining ‘Africa’ as a collective actor. In 
this sense, perhaps it was pan-Africanism that most significantly ‘invented Africa’.  
 
Some of the earliest manifestations of this discourse can be found in the lives and 
writings of African American intellectuals in the USA and the Caribbean in the late 
nineteenth century.37 From Henry Sylvester-William, W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, 
C.L.R James and George Padmore (amongst others), multiple visions for the 
emancipation of black colonial subjects and the creation of African polities were 
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articulated and co-constituted. These visions were products of local experiences and 
individual genius but also of an increasing experience and awareness of 
internationalism, something not unusual in the early twentieth century, but which was 
perhaps most politically significant in the case of pan-Africanism.38 Through recurrent 
communication, collaboration and conferences, the leading intellectuals of this classical 
pan-Africanism would inspire the next generation of pan-Africanist activists to think 
always internationally in what can only be called a form of ‘subaltern geopolitics’.39     
 
Re-casting race from a category of alienation to one of redemption, and western 
knowledge from a source of subjection to a means of struggle, the early pan-Africanist 
movement set in motion some of the greatest events of the last century in world politics. 
Following the influence of the first Pan-African Conference in 1900 and the Pan-
African Congresses of 1919, 1921, 1923 and 1927, a new generation of thinkers and 
activists arose.40 Amongst these, and in most explicit connection with the 
aforementioned activists, was Kwame Nkrumah – the future architect of Ghanaian 
Independence. Nkrumah worked tirelessly for the cause of African decolonisation, 
national independence and African continental federalism; aided directly by 
intellectuals from the earlier generation, like George Padmore.41 Other 
activists/thinkers, however, also marked this second generation of pan-Africanism. The 
Francophone movement of Négritude, for example, was particularly significant in 
deploying art, thought and activism towards decolonisation. This movement was 
embodied in people such as Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor and later influential pan-
African giants like Frantz Fanon. Négritude was particularly impactful, emphasising a 
‘phenomenology of blackness’ and the rich cultural heritage of African peoples. This 
movement, much like earlier forms of pan-Africanism focused on racial unity as ‘a tool 
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of redemption’ for Africa,42 and was a form of ‘strategic essentialism’43 used to subvert 
colonial categories and experiences, but also to exceed them. This excess was, in the 
context of modern pan-Africanism, increasingly solidified through the imagination of 
a liberated Africa united in the creation of a post-colonial society focused on the 
prosperity, dignity and well-being of subaltern peoples.44 This justified an increasing 
focus on liberation struggles in Africa after the Second World War.    
 
From the 1950s onwards then, decolonization struggles were fought on African soil and 
within forty years pan-African movements would bring down all colonial provinces in 
the continent and experiment in projects of post-colonial state-building.45 During this 
period, many influential thinkers articulated and co-constituted a range of (geo)political 
imaginaries for their countries and communities. Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Mobido 
Keita, Patrice Lumumba, Agostinho Neto, Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth 
Kaunda, Amílcar Cabral all stand out as leaders outlining such visions. Characteristic 
of this generation of decolonial pan-Africanism was an emphasis on ‘national 
liberation’ as a framing device to African liberation. This sense of ‘national’ was 
ironically made possible by the collective experience of colonial administration and 
territorial divisions and facilitated by Woodrow Wilson’s defence of national self-
determination in the Paris Peace Conference.46 In following this strategy, racialized 
conceptions of pan-Africanism gradually declined and were substituted by a conception 
of continental pan-Africanism emphasising state-building through inclusive 
conceptions of nationalism and modernism. Significantly, such a shift in emphasis was 
not only precipitated by a shift in dominant geopolitical scripts (i.e. from race to 
national self-determination), but also in the experience of early post-colonial 
independence, where mobilizing ‘race’ was seen as potentially stirring up colonial-
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made divisions and vindictive violence.  As Amílcar Cabral, an anti-colonial leader 
from Guinea Bissau, argued, superseding the cultural ravages of colonialism on African 
peoples relied not on a full return to tradition, the idealization of a common African 
culture or an embrace of foreign culture (i.e. high modernism), but on using the 
struggles of national liberation to organize cross-class and cross-ethnic contact under a 
common cause, thus enabling cultural ‘convergence’. This cultural convergence would 
rely on rediscovering local cultures and, through deep dialogue, exploring how local 
culture could be connected positively with foreign cultures and reformed of negative 
aspects, thereby furthering the cause of anti-oppressive humanistic egalitarianism 
inherent in the liberation struggle.47   
 
Most interesting in these two waves of pan-Africanism is how a subaltern (geo)politics 
was created from and against categories and structures of domination. Dominant scripts 
were not rejected outright, but reproduced and subverted in securing an improved 
position structurally, materially and ontologically. In the first wave of pan-Africanism, 
for example, race was used and subverted to create geopolitical scripts of transatlantic 
subaltern unity and foster the dream of post-colonial state-making in Africa. This was 
in direct response to, not only dominant geopolitical scripts of racial hierarchy, but also 
against actual projects of imperialism in the ‘Scramble for Africa’. The first wave of 
pan-Africanists thereby subverted race – a tool of fragmentation and alienation – into a 
tool for unification and ontological security by resurrecting blackness as a positive 
category. In doing this, pan-Africanists not only created resistant forms of thought, but 
also alternative geopolitical scripts enabling projects of political decolonization.  
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In the second wave of pan-Africanism, a new form of subaltern geopolitics was 
articulated by using and subverting the concept of ‘national self-determination’ then 
sweeping world politics. Using and subverting, rather than rejecting, the western 
concept of ‘nation’, pan-Africanist activists created alternative geopolitical scripts to 
advance their position of marginal power. Deploying ‘nation’ as a framing device, pan-
Africanist movements presented their struggles as confirmation of (rather than as 
opposition to) dominant geopolitical scripts after the First World War.48 Exceeding this, 
however, pan-Africanists re-invented nationalism to embrace more inclusive 
conceptions emphasizing supranational post-colonial solidarity in a unique way.49 This 
was key, not only because it enabled fine-tuning of scripts to the conditions of liberation 
wars, but also because it permitted a continuation and expansion of former bases to 
resist hegemonic powers. This expansion was, for instance, borne out in the creation of 
the non-aligned movement; a crucial alternative geopolitical script in the context of 
navigating decolonization during and after the Cold War.50 Most crucial in the re-
articulations of these subaltern geopolitics of the second wave of pan-Africanism is 
how discursive changes were adapted, not only to speak to shifts in dominant 
geopolitical scripts, but also to continue challenging these scripts by emphasizing 
continuity and expansion of the former emphasis on subaltern solidarity.  
 
As highlighted in the next section, reading decolonial pan-Africanism as a form of 
subaltern geopolitics helps raise important questions regarding the geopolitics of the 
Brand Africa initiative. Before this, however, it is important to address a crucial caveat 
to the pan-African tradition of subaltern geopolitics discussed above. This concerns 
acknowledging the inevitable persistence of politics within and amongst subaltern 
geopolitical imaginaries and projects. The generic alignments of pan-Africanist 
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movements described above were plural and sometimes divergent and even conflictual. 
Recognizing this is important to avoid romanticizing the role and discourses of pan-
African leaders and movements. Such plurality and dissension was, for example, highly 
significant during the first wave of African independence in the 1950s. For example, 
whereas Nkrumah advocated moving quickly towards continent-wide federalism in 
order to resist any neo-colonial ambitions world powers may still harbour, others argued 
this was unnecessary and even unhelpful as it threatened to limit the newly and hard 
won gains of national liberation and limited the range of geopolitical options available 
to each country. Thus, whereas Nkrumah argued for political and economic unification 
in a Union of African States as the only way of securing the new states from neo-
colonial tactics of ‘divide and rule’,51 others, such as Leopold Senghor and Philibert 
Tsiranana, saw the maintenance of local independence and the reconstruction of 
preferential ties to former colonial powers as preferable geopolitical choices.52  
 
In the end, it is important to emphasise that Nkrumah, though hailed as the father of 
(continental) pan-Africanism, was ousted from his presidency and sidelined in the 
liberation movement. Consequently, the Organization of African Unity, created in 
1963, ended up primarily emphasising national independence and loose cooperation, 
rather than comprehensive continental political and economic integration.53 It was this 
outcome, more than anything else, which solidified the agreement that African colonial 
regional units would be preserved as the structure of independence.54 However, despite 
Nkrumah’s fall pan-Africanism did not lose its value as a tradition from which to draw 
a plurality of subaltern geopolitical imaginations. Pan-Africanism, for all its dissensus 
and failures, remained a common basis for a sense of post-colonial ontological 
security.55 This, as we will now argue, is not least evident in the Brand Africa initiative.  
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The Pan-Africanism of Brand Africa: A new subaltern geopolitics?  
 
At one level it is possible to see synergies and compatibilities between Brand Africa’s 
pan-Africanist discourse of supranational branding, and more historically ingrained 
anti/post-colonial discourses of pan-Africanist supranational identity. Brand Africa, as 
with past supranational discourses, claims to be focused on re-appropriating the idea of 
Africa to unite and empower subaltern subjects marked by the continued denigrations 
of phenotype and continent. This compatibility between a pan-African supranational 
tradition and Brand Africa’s supranational branding is openly proclaimed, with Brand 
Africa publications directly invoking and quoting key pan-African figures, like 
Nkrumah.56 Such compatibility, though claimed rhetorically, is not explored in detail 
within Brand Africa’s documents and statements. This is perhaps unsurprising, because 
the discourse of capitalist globalization underpinning the drive for Brand Africa stands 
in stark opposition to the often heavily socialist – and anti-capitalist/anti-imperialist – 
inspired leanings of key spokespersons of pan-Africanism, like Cabral, Nkrumah, 
Nyerere, Fanon and Touré.57 Thus, while Brand Africa identifies the same problem as 
decolonial pan-Africanism – the need to overcome the denigration of Africa and 
Africans – and reaches for a similar solution – in terms of seeking to re-appropriate and 
invert established markers of denigration such that they now become sources of dignity 
and pride – the nature of the solutions offered are strongly dissonant.  
 
Particularly notable is that the pan-Africanism of these ‘fathers of liberation’ generally 
emphasized the need for African societies to reclaim their history through the formation 
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of effective states and the re-appropriation of their destiny/history through cultural 
renovation (see above). Central to such calls was precisely the need to liberate the 
African self from preoccupations with others’ claims about Africa, in favour of a more 
internally focused dialogue about how to create viable and progressive post-colonial 
African identities. Expressed in the language of decolonial critique, an emphasis on 
supranational pan-Africanism was therefore part of a project to escape processes of 
auto-orientalism (of internalizing others’ negative images about the self’s ineptitude, 
lack of development and civilization) and to establish a more inclusive and internally 
coherent basis for reclaiming self-esteem and subjectivity. Crucial in these projects, 
radical inclusivity and subversive mimicking were deployed as part of a distinctive 
subaltern geopolitics.  
 
In contrast, Brand Africa begins many of its discursive iterations by actually 
foregrounding the (perceived) perennial failures of African nation-states and how they 
have left Africa geopolitically and governmentally wanting. This, in a sense, reifies 
Western depictions and presents African failures as a mostly self-contained event. In 
this context, Africa, we have seen, is urged to take a stand and get an agenda, with 
branding precisely seen as a mechanism for a more active and much less passive 
engagement with international political actors and global markets. Branding therefore 
becomes a mechanism enabling Africa finally to take full control of its destiny by 
producing a regime of representation which would galvanize African peoples and entice 
‘global’ business. In contrast to decolonial discourses of pan-Africanism, therefore, the 
subaltern geopolitics of Brand Africa reproduces hegemonic western standards of 
neoliberal subjectivity and conduct. What it does seek to do, however, is assert Africa 
as an equal player and subject on the global scene, without explicitly challenging the 
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rules by which global economic and political interactions are played. Brand Africa 
mimics branding tropes and technologies but seems less successful in subverting these 
in order to exceed their hegemonic effects.  
 
To this extent, while the Brand Africa initiative has sought to appropriate the pan-
African decolonial heritage it takes its cue more directly from more contemporary 
discourses of ‘Africa rising’ and of an emergent ‘African Renaissance’.58 Given the 
influence of the South African context underlying the Brand Africa initiative (discussed 
below), South African president Thabo Mbeki’s emphasis on an ‘African Renaissance’ 
has been particularly important.59 This grand strategy, on top of renewing pan-
Africanism in institutional form (i.e. by establishing the African Union and the New 
Economic Partnership for Development), also transformed it in content, by emphasising 
investment, entrepreneurship, economic regional integration and good governance over 
foreign aid.60 It is within this strategy that Brand Africa, as an initiative that focuses on 
brand-management as an economic driver, locates itself. By bringing the language of 
nation-branding, however, Brand Africa provides a twist to the politics of what has been 
proclaimed will be ‘the African century’; namely, by radically shifting the grounds on 
which Africa is to deal with its own identity. This makes Brand Africa’s references to 
pan-Africanist leaders, both inside and outside the continent (e.g. Lumumba, Malcolm 
X, Garvey, Nkrumah), intriguing. Such names are clearly invoked for their ability to 
seduce and attract African audiences, insofar as they are shorthand markers for a 
narrative of pride in being African and an enhanced standing for Africa in the world. 
As such, these figures continue to play important roles in African identity politics as 
markers of mobilization and legitimation, even if the politics they stood for was starkly 
opposed to that embodied within Brand Africa’s embrace of global capitalism. 
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However, while Brand Africa is therefore able to position itself as helping realise the 
decolonial leaders’ dreams, ironically, despite apparent intentions otherwise, there is a 
danger of reinforcing (auto-)orientalist supranational imaginings of Africa. This is 
because, rather than calling for an emphasis on self-actualisation and ‘internal’ dialogue 
– as emphasized by decolonial leaders – the focus in a branding world is on anticipating 
and responding to the perceptions of powerful others, or put more abstractly, ‘the 
market’. Thus, instead of decolonial pan-Africanism’s emphasis on building African 
authenticity, the logic of branding is to shift the focus more towards packaging and 
commodifying the self in terms of what might sell in the international marketplace, with 
the Brand Africa initiative actively encouraging African stakeholders 
(nations/groups/individuals) to do just that.61 Under the Brand Africa discourse, 
therefore, while African societies are encouraged to focus on dispelling the negative 
images that populate the minds of those that could invest in ‘Africa’ and thus make it 
prosper, it is evident that certain discourses and images are to be preferred – namely, 
those following market(ing) logics.  
 
This is especially evident in Brand Africa’s most conspicuous initiative – the Brand 
Africa 100 - which places emphasis on enhancing Brand Africa through enhancing the 
visibility and performance of African product brands on the (contested62) belief that 
people’s perceptions of product brands influence their view of the country/continent in 
which they are produced, as well as the socio-economic prospects of that country.63 In 
Brand Africa’s own words, this focus is ‘founded on the proven premise that developing 
and building successful brands in Africa will help Africa create jobs and a tax base to 
fund public goods, and to create a favourable reputation of Africa as an entrepreneurial, 
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independent and competitive continent’.64 Furthermore, such re-branding moves are 
said to have some clear metrics of success – as evident in the publication of the Brand 
Africa 100 series which measures the relative performance of Africa’s top 100 product 
brands – and to be supported by a cohort of expert consulting enterprises.65 These 
rankings, however, are calculated on the basis of corporate revenues and, to a lesser 
extent, consumer research. This, though defining ‘value’ by reference to financial 
standing and consumer perception, does nothing to integrate measurements of job 
creation, tax base increase or public good provision. This leaves the initiative’s claims 
unverified and hints at the lop-sided role of rankings in their representative claims – 
enhancing the visibility of big business and doing little else.  
 
Most significantly, however, the effect of such emphases is to reduce the ‘success’ and 
content of Brand Africa, and the supranational sense of African unity upon which it 
claims to be based and build, to questions of corporate performance – a vision far 
removed from the pan-Africanism advocated by the ‘fathers of liberation’. By actively 
seeking to educate Africans in the value of developing and valuing consumer brands, 
Brand Africa ends up unquestioningly appropriating just the latest set of ‘Western’ 
norms and ‘knowledge’ about development, without particular attention or debate on 
whether those norms are the most appropriate to their context.66 The re-branding of 
African identities towards something ‘successful’ is thus presented as a matter of smart, 
pro-active and entrepreneurial governance rather than a deep political and cultural 
debate with no predictable or pressing end.  
 
The advent of the language of supranational branding therefore poses significant 
challenges to the language of identity of the decolonial movement and arguably has 
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potentially serious implications for how narratives of pan-Africanism and African 
modernity have been understood as contributing to the sense of collective self-esteem 
and ontological security in Africa. In other words, if the pan-Africanism of the 
decolonial movement arguably sought to cast the perceptions of the other aside, central 
to the very idea of Brand Africa is precisely a reprioritization of ‘what they think of us’, 
and a demand to mould the self in accordance with ‘their’ anticipated desires. Based on 
fulfilling the image of ‘competitiveness’, this pan-Africanism becomes one of ranks 
and hierarchies where the countries with the most developed transnational markets and 
corporations are heralded as a model of a ‘good society’ to which the entirety of Africa 
should strive towards. To this extent, the advent of supranational branding in the form 
of Brand Africa poses a notable challenge to previous discourses of supranational 
identity in Africa, since ultimately they support very different visions of 
possible/desirable African futures.  
 
Most significantly, although Brand Africa’s discourse remains premised on creatively 
combating the continent’s geopolitical marginalization, its usage of branding 
techniques seems to lack almost any subversive tactics. In embracing new and 
momentous geostrategic tools, Brand Africa seems to reveal a subaltern ambition to 
‘rise up the ranks’, but little subaltern ingenuity to challenge the scripts in which such 
ranks operate. This is all the more significant in that the dominant geopolitical scripts 
in which ‘branding’ works may well carry logics and tropes which reproduce Western 
hegemony. In its emphasis on entrepreneurialism as a new category to mobilize pan-
Africanism, Brand Africa appears awkwardly unengaged with the role that languages 
of entrepreneurialism may have had in re-producing African denigration and 
marginality.  
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Brand Africa’s Differential Geostrategic Openings 
 
Beyond the issue of desirable futures, however, proclamations that Brand Africa should 
be understood as a ‘global African initiative for Africa by Africa’ (original emphasis)67 
also need to be questioned. Underpinning such claims is the assumption that the 
generation of a positive supranational branding campaign will be beneficial to all 
African nations (and to all African peoples). However, in spite of these claims to 
continent-wide bases of participation and interest-representation, Brand Africa is 
notably skewed in its discursive iterations and personal networks. For all the rhetoric 
of supranational solidarity, scrutiny of Brand Africa’s documentation betrays the 
geopolitical embeddedness of this ‘independent’ non-profit initiative. Evident in the 
Brand Africa initiative is a specific South African geopolitical project – one that seeks 
to secure its predominance in representing the continent’s prospects. Given this context, 
Brand Africa’s geopolitical scripting is revealed, not only as ushered through the 
embrace of branding logics, but also as a geopolitical project with differential strategic 
openings for countries across the continent.  
 
This is perhaps unsurprising since South Africa has been a principal sponsor of the 
Brand Africa initiative, and provides the geographical institutional home of the now 
independent and non-profit Brand Africa organisation. However, despite its now 
independent status the organisation lists Brand South Africa as one of only two of its 
nation-branding country patrons (the other being Kenya),68 while Thebe Ikalafeng, the 
founder of the Brand Africa initiative, also sits on the Board of Trustees of Brand South 
 24 
Africa and is vice chairman of the Brand Council of South Africa.69 Such links not only 
indicate official South African support for the initiative, but also the close connections 
and assumed synergies between them.  
 
Established in the same year as the 2010 FIFA World Cup, Brand Africa seems closely 
tied to South African geopolitical ambitions of regional leadership, as well as to the 
desire to overcome the legacies of Apartheid, internally and internationally. Shifting 
from its position as a latecomer to the processes of decolonisation,70 South Africa has 
sought to recast itself as the foremost leader of the ‘African century’. In seeking to 
redefine itself, South Africa has sought to redefine its geopolitical context. This is no 
less evident than in its own nation branding programme’s emphasis on the need to 
embrace the ‘opportunity to drive the rebranding of Africa’71 and on understanding 
‘Africa’ as an economic opportunity that needs to be ‘strategically leveraged’ (our 
emphasis).72 For South Africa, discourses of Brand Africa and Brand South Africa 
therefore appear reinforcing, with supranational branding becoming part of 
rearticulating a national role. 
 
However, the relationship between nation branding and supranational branding in the 
form of Brand Africa is not wholly without tension. For instance, whilst Brand Africa 
is premised on disabusing established stereotypes of Africa, the Brand South Africa 
campaign has tended to position the country as a ‘gateway’ into the continent, doing so 
by depicting South Africa as stable and modern and ultimately a place where privileged 
foreigners will feel at home – in contrast to other parts of Africa which remain implicitly 
tainted with negative stereotypes of African otherness and instability.73 Hence, while 
Africa’s brand image may be seen to be improving – and South Africa has an interest 
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in this – its own nation branding campaign strategically positions the country as a 
mediator between foreign investors and the African sub-continent (for more on Brand 
South Africa see Cornelissen in this volume).  
 
In this regard, Brand Africa reinforces Brand South Africa, with South Africa becoming 
positioned as an investment hub sucking in and filtering international and regional 
capital and labour. Hence, Brand South Africa publications speak of South Africa, not 
only as the ‘gateway to a billion African consumers’, but as ‘the powerhouse of a rising 
continent’ and a ‘springboard’ and ‘catalyst’ for growth elsewhere in the continent.74 
Framed slightly differently, economically South Africa is likely to benefit 
disproportionately from the development of surrounding countries and the continent in 
general, but also from enhanced ‘regional market integration’,75 not least because South 
African companies are likely to be particularly well placed to benefit from the 
expansion of regional consumer markets because of their already significant market 
penetration.76 There is, in short, a particularly strong incentive for South African 
companies to support a branding platform that depicts them driving an African 
renaissance rather than just following market logics. To this extent, discourses of Brand 
Africa serve to occlude regional discrepancies of uneven exploitation in favour of an 
emphasis on market access, while also implicitly (yet problematically) presuming that 
a continental branding campaign will benefit all.  
 
In this respect, while open opposition to the Brand Africa initiative appears to be 
lacking, the fact that only a few African countries have actively embraced the initiative 
is intriguing. The various investment promotion agencies of countries around the 
SADC, for instance, show no mention of a connection to Brand Africa.77 Such apparent 
 26 
relative disinterest may have several explanations. First, Brand Africa is likely to be 
most attractive to those African countries which, like South Africa, have more open-
facing and globalised economies than their immediate neighbours, that have developed 
national infrastructures and national industries in consumer goods, as well as regional 
leadership ambitions. Kenya’s support for the initiative might be explained in these 
terms, although this is not a determinative argument since, on these grounds, active 
support from countries like Nigeria might also be expected.  
 
At the same time, oil-based economies like that of Nigeria or Angola appear able to 
draw in abundant foreign investment, often irrespective of negative images associated 
with them, as the global powers compete for access to oil reserves.78 This perhaps 
suggests that claims about the transformative economic effects and attractions of place 
branding are overplayed. However, irrespective of the evidence for or against on this 
point, the issue is not that those African countries with a lack of evident enthusiasm for 
the Brand Africa initiative do not believe in place branding. Indeed, many have 
developed their own nation branding programmes (e.g. Angola, Ghana). Another 
possible explanation is therefore that, understanding place branding to be an inherently 
competitive discourse of zero-sum gains,79 they see themselves as competing with other 
African nations over and above competing with those on other continents. Small 
nations, for instance, may worry that their distinctiveness will be subsumed and lost 
within a broader continental brand (or alternatively may wish to free-ride on the efforts 
of others). 
 
A final point, though, also presents itself. At root the Brand Africa initiative is premised 
on the assumption that the best way of tackling Africa’s negative ‘continent brand 
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effect’ is to respond by rejuvenating that brand, thereby reproducing a dominant 
geopolitical gaze that treats Africa as a collective actor and site of experience. As we 
have argued, insofar as subaltern readings of pan-Africanism have provided a source of 
self-esteem and ontological security, then the temptations of continuing to respond in 
this way are evident. However, it is always possible for states to engage in alternative 
geostrategic branding practices that for varying reasons may feel more appropriate for 
them. For instance, Angola, in spite of having established its own multifaceted nation-
branding campaign,80 makes no mention of Brand Africa and rarely frames its re-
imaging in relation to the disabusing negative representations of the African continent.  
Instead, Angola’s nation-branding efforts highlight the uniqueness of Angola’s history 
and prospects and emphasise its increasing ascendancy in the context of the community 
of Portuguese-speaking countries. This, in contrast to South African efforts, seeks to 
overcome the colonial heritage, not by appealing to a re-attachment to Africa, but rather 
by pronouncing a re-drawing of relations within the post-colonial lusophone 
community. In this context, Angola seems to engage with the lusophone community 
(esp. Brazil and Portugal), rather than Africa itself, as ‘an opportunity that must be 
leveraged’ to accrue geopolitical advantages such as increased investment and 
recognition.81 Advantageous to this path, it should be noted, is not only that a direct 
confrontation with other African states over regional influence is avoided but also that 
the challenge of shedding the continent’s negative associations is bypassed (i.e. Angola 
does not aim to speak for Africa, while Africa is not seen to speak for Angola).82 A 
further illustrative example is Rwanda, which has sought to refashion itself, and more 
specifically its capital city, Kigali, as a ‘Singapore of Africa’.83 Mobilising these efforts 
in political rhetoric as well as in urban planning visions, Rwanda has sought to engage 
in a politics of representation from the margins which bypasses the perceived need for 
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the continental rebranding of Africa in favour of focusing on Rwanda as a ‘hub’ of 
technology and cutting-edge smart industry in a world of global ‘flows’ (Castells 
2011).84 The ‘Singapore of Africa’ metaphor therefore locates Rwanda beyond the 
bounds of former colonial, linguistic or pan-African links and rather as a nodal point of 
globalisation.85  
 
What these examples suggest, therefore, is that the very premise that African countries 
would have to necessarily counter negative images of Africa with more positive ones 
of pan-African supranational branding is not self-evident and, indeed, may be justified 
only in the context of certain geopolitical projects (i.e. South African regional 
leadership). Other geopolitical resources exist by which subaltern nations may seek to 
create alternative politics of representation to serve their strategic goals. While the 
progressive and subversive nature of these alternatives should be debated, it is 
nevertheless important to note their existence in order to indicate a plurality of subaltern 
geopolitical tactics, even amongst actors embracing ‘branding’ as a key tool in 
international politics. Key for the purposes of this paper, is the fact that a wide number 
of African states engaged in nation-branding bypass Brand Africa’s emphasis on the 
need to tackle continental images, showing a plethora of alternative routes and shedding 
doubt over the regional appeal of Brand Africa’s geopolitical/representational motives. 
Brand Africa, in short, for all its rhetoric of breadth and inclusiveness, seems singularly 
designed to the context of South African geopolitical ambitions.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 29 
This paper has presented the Brand Africa initiative as a form of subaltern geopolitics 
that draws its mobilising potential from two sources: the assumed power of branding 
practices to transform images and fortunes; and the seductive attraction of historical 
conceptions of decolonial pan-Africanism as a source of empowerment, self-esteem 
and ontological security. Steeped in the ‘politics of representation at the margins’,86 
Brand Africa, we have argued, embodies a new kind of subaltern geopolitics, albeit one 
wearing neoliberal stripes. Several conclusions can be drawn from the discussion.  
 
Perhaps most fundamental is how, in an African context, supranational branding in the 
form of a pan-African project for Brand Africa, does not sit easily with pan-African 
supranational identity discourses of decolonisation, even though it draws some of its 
legitimating force from them by calling for an emphasis on a shared identity and sense 
of solidarity in remaking Africa’s future. However, whereas the pan-Africanism of the 
‘leaders of liberation’ called for a socialist-inspired internally focused dialogue and a 
refusal to place outsiders’ concerns and perceptions at the heart of debates about 
reclaiming subjectivity, branding implies a more direct engagement with capitalist 
logics and in turn with the (historically) orientalist gaze of global economic elites. 
These essentially call for Africans to respond by reshaping themselves and their 
societies precisely in accordance with the norms and anticipated desires of these 
outsiders. At a conceptual level, therefore, the language of supranational branding, by 
reprioritising outsiders’ perceptions, has the potential to fundamentally challenge, not 
only contending discourses of pan-African identity, but also the geostrategic futures 
they envisage. This is not least evident in the contrast between Brand Africa’s advocacy 
for the pan-African benefits of increasing the visibility of big business and Nyerere’s 
earlier advocacy that pan-African geopolitics should act as a ‘trade union of the poor’ 
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in a neo-colonial world order.87 The subversive nature of Brand Africa as a form of 
subaltern geopolitics is therefore limited because, although it seeks to challenge the 
positional status of Africa in global geopolitical visions, it does not seek to challenge 
the rules of the game or subvert the overall framing.  
 
In turn, however, the article has also suggested that the supranational discourse of Brand 
Africa is far from hegemonic. Couched in the context of South African geopolitical 
designs, Brand Africa does not elicit broad enthusiasm across the continent. Sensitive 
to the differential geostrategic openings provided by Brand Africa’s politics of 
representation, other countries in Africa have engaged in alternative strategies 
combining the language of branding and geopolitical calculus. Thus, albeit a superficial 
appeal in Brand Africa’s precepts of disabusing denigrations of Africa, its claim that 
concerted collective rebranding is the strategy to be pursued seems to hold little real 
traction. In short, there is no generalizable straightforward synergy between nation 
branding and supranational branding, just as there is no straightforward generalizable 
synergy between supranational branding and supranational identity discourses. Indeed, 
what the article has rather demonstrated is the extent to which supranational branding 
can constitute a mechanism for generating consent at both a national and regional level, 
that appeals to concerns related to issues of politics, economics and identity, but the 
benefits of which are likely to be distributed differentially. In this light, in Africa, as 
elsewhere, the ‘power of (nation-)branding’ can only be made sense of through a 
geopolitical sensibility, which spatially situates power dynamics.   
 
As we have argued, it is quite easy to see Brand Africa as a private initiative at least in 
part inspired by the strategic vision articulated within the Brand South Africa 
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programme for South Africa to embrace the ‘opportunity to drive the rebranding of 
Africa’ (emphasis added).88 This, however, implies more than simply to suggest that 
the nation branding of South Africa is tied to advancing positive images about ‘being 
African’ and the prospects of the continent. Crucially, it implies encouraging other 
African nations to recognise this rebranding as meaningful and, in turn, embrace its 
language. This then has a necessary effect not only on questions of hegemonic 
representation (i.e. which state has the strongest voice in defining the image of its 
region) but also in terms of governance/governmentality. This is because encouraging 
other states to embrace nation branding programmes, and in particular tying this to the 
creation of national/African product brands, necessarily entails these states accepting 
the world-vision this implies (i.e. that nations need to manage their image in order to 
be able to participate effectively in globalisation, while citizens should be encouraged 
to actively embody branding efforts) and the strategic predominance of those that best 
embrace this vision. In other words, ‘an opportunity to drive the rebranding of Africa’, 
not only signifies an opportunity to speak for Africa, but also operates as a mechanism 
to frame the very language via which Africans may imagine their future.  
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